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summary, title, sidebarTitle, read_when, status
| summary | title | sidebarTitle | read_when | status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Per-agent sandbox + tool restrictions, precedence, and examples | Multi-agent sandbox and tools | Multi-agent sandbox and tools | You want per-agent sandboxing or per-agent tool allow/deny policies in a multi-agent gateway. | active |
Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.
Backends and modes — full sandbox reference. Debug "why is this blocked?" Elevated exec for trusted senders. Auth is scoped by agent: each agent has its own `agentDir` auth store at `~/.openclaw/agents//agent/auth-profiles.json`. Never reuse `agentDir` across agents. Agents can read through to the default/main agent's auth profiles when they do not have a local profile, but OAuth refresh tokens are not cloned into secondary agent stores. If you copy credentials manually, copy only portable static `api_key` or `token` profiles.Configuration examples
```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "main", "default": true, "name": "Personal Assistant", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } }, { "id": "family", "name": "Family Bot", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family", "sandbox": { "mode": "all", "scope": "agent" }, "tools": { "allow": ["read"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"] } } ] }, "bindings": [ { "agentId": "family", "match": { "provider": "whatsapp", "accountId": "*", "peer": { "kind": "group", "id": "120363424282127706@g.us" } } } ] } ```**Result:**
- `main` agent: runs on host, full tool access.
- `family` agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only `read` tool.
**Result:**
- default agents get coding tools.
- `support` agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).
Configuration precedence
When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.list[].*) configs exist:
Sandbox config
Agent-specific settings override global:
agents.list[].sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.list[].sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.list[].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.list[].sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.list[].sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.list[].sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*
Tool restrictions
The filtering order is:
`tools.profile` or `agents.list[].tools.profile`. `tools.byProvider[provider].profile` or `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile`. `tools.allow` / `tools.deny`. `tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`. `agents.list[].tools.allow/deny`. `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`. `tools.sandbox.tools` or `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools`. `tools.subagents.tools`, if applicable. - Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels. - If `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `tools.sandbox.tools` for that agent. - If `agents.list[].tools.profile` is set, it overrides `tools.profile` for that agent. - Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.4`). If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as `agents.list[].tools.allow: ["query_db"]` should fail loudly until the plugin that registers `query_db` is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.
Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.list[].tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.
Migration from single agent
```json { "agents": { "defaults": { "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "non-main" } } }, "tools": { "sandbox": { "tools": { "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"], "deny": [] } } } } ``` ```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "main", "default": true, "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } } ] } } ``` Legacy `agent.*` configs are migrated by `openclaw doctor`; prefer `agents.defaults` + `agents.list` going forward.Tool restriction examples
```json { "tools": { "allow": ["read"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"] } } ``` ```json { "tools": { "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"], "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"] } } ``` ```json { "tools": { "sessions": { "visibility": "tree" }, "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"] } } ````sessions_history` in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, `<relevant-memories>` scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including `<tool_call>...</tool_call>`, `<function_call>...</function_call>`, `<tool_calls>...</tool_calls>`, `<function_calls>...</function_calls>`, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.
Common pitfall: "non-main"
`agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main"` is based on `session.mainKey` (default `"main"`), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, set `agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "off"`.Testing
After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
```bash openclaw agents list --bindings ``` ```bash docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-" ``` - Send a message requiring restricted tools. - Verify the agent cannot use denied tools. ```bash tail -f "${OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw}/logs/gateway.log" | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools" ```Troubleshooting
- Check if there's a global `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` that overrides it. - Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set `agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "all"`. - Check tool filtering order: global → agent → sandbox → subagent. - Each level can only further restrict, not grant back. - Verify with logs: `[tools] filtering tools for agent:${agentId}`. - Set `scope: "agent"` in agent-specific sandbox config. - Default is `"session"` which creates one container per session.Related
- Elevated mode
- Multi-agent routing
- Sandbox configuration
- Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated — debugging "why is this blocked?"
- Sandboxing — full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
- Session management