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docs: normalize mintlify component closings
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@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ Keep hook endpoints behind loopback, tailnet, or trusted reverse proxy.
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- Keep `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=false` unless you require caller-selected sessions.
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- If you enable `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey`, also set `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain allowed session key shapes.
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- Hook payloads are wrapped with safety boundaries by default.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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## Gmail PubSub integration
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@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ Model override note:
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- Configured fallback chains still apply because cron `--model` is a job primary, not a session `/model` override.
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- Payload `fallbacks` replaces configured fallbacks for that job; `fallbacks: []` disables fallback and makes the run strict.
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- A plain `--model` with no explicit or configured fallback list does not fall through to the agent primary as a silent extra retry target.
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</Note>
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</Note>
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## Configuration
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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Current OpenClaw releases bundle BlueBubbles, so normal packaged builds do not n
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- Always set a webhook password.
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- Webhook authentication is always required. OpenClaw rejects BlueBubbles webhook requests unless they include a password/guid that matches `channels.bluebubbles.password` (for example `?password=<password>` or `x-password`), regardless of loopback/proxy topology.
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- Password authentication is checked before reading/parsing full webhook bodies.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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## Keeping Messages.app alive (VM / headless setups)
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Translation: allowlisted senders can trigger OpenClaw by mentioning it.
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- **DM access** is controlled by `*.allowFrom`.
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- **Group access** is controlled by `*.groupPolicy` + allowlists (`*.groups`, `*.groupAllowFrom`).
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- **Reply triggering** is controlled by mention gating (`requireMention`, `/activation`).
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</Note>
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</Note>
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Quick flow (what happens to a group message):
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@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ External scripts and webhooks can post buttons directly via the Mattermost REST
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4. Action `id` must be **alphanumeric only** (`[a-zA-Z0-9]`). Hyphens and underscores break Mattermost's server-side action routing (returns 404). Strip them before use.
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5. `context.action_id` must match the button's `id` so the confirmation message shows the button name (e.g., "Approve") instead of a raw ID.
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6. `context.action_id` is required — the interaction handler returns 400 without it.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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**HMAC token generation**
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@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ This happens **before** a normal reply is generated, so the message can feel lik
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- Add the model to `agents.defaults.models`, or
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- Clear the allowlist (remove `agents.defaults.models`), or
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- Pick a model from `/model list`.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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Example allowlist config:
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@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ Use `accountId` to target a specific account on multi-account channels like Tele
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- `main` (default): agent main session.
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- Explicit session key (copy from `openclaw sessions --json` or the [sessions CLI](/cli/sessions)).
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- Session key formats: see [Sessions](/concepts/session) and [Groups](/channels/groups).
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</ParamField>
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</ParamField>
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<ParamField path="target" type="string">
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- `last`: deliver to the last used external channel.
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- explicit channel: any configured channel or plugin id, for example `discord`, `matrix`, `telegram`, or `whatsapp`.
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Node pairing is a trust and identity flow plus token issuance. It does **not** p
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- Live node commands come from what the node declares on connect after the gateway's global node command policy (`gateway.nodes.allowCommands` and `denyCommands`) is applied.
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- Per-node `system.run` allow and ask policy lives on the node in `exec.approvals.node.*`, not in the pairing record.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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## Node command gating (2026.3.31+)
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@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ Example (read-only source + an extra data directory):
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- Sensitive mounts (secrets, SSH keys, service credentials) should be `:ro` unless absolutely required.
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- Combine with `workspaceAccess: "ro"` if you only need read access to the workspace; bind modes stay independent.
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- See [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) for how binds interact with tool policy and elevated exec.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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## Images and setup
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@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Implications:
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- Internal Gateway clients that do not travel through the reverse proxy should use `gateway.auth.password` / `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD`, not trusted-proxy identity headers.
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- Non-loopback Control UI deployments still need explicit `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins`.
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- **Forwarded-header evidence overrides loopback locality for local direct fallback.** If a request arrives on loopback but carries `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Forwarded-Host` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers pointing at a non-local origin, that evidence disqualifies local-direct password fallback and device-identity gating. With `allowLoopback: true`, trusted-proxy auth can still accept the request as a same-host proxy request, while `requiredHeaders` and `allowUsers` continue to apply.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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### Configuration reference
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@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ For CLI entries, **set `capabilities` explicitly** to avoid surprising matches.
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- `minimax` and `minimax-portal` image understanding comes from the plugin-owned `MiniMax-VL-01` media provider.
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- The bundled MiniMax text catalog still starts text-only; explicit `models.providers.minimax` entries materialize image-capable M2.7 chat refs.
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</Note>
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</Note>
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## Model selection guidance
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@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ top-level `bindings[]` entries.
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- **Telegram forum topic:** `match.channel="telegram"` + `match.peer.id="<chatId>:topic:<topicId>"`
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- **BlueBubbles DM/group:** `match.channel="bluebubbles"` + `match.peer.id="<handle|chat_id:*|chat_guid:*|chat_identifier:*>"`. Prefer `chat_id:*` or `chat_identifier:*` for stable group bindings.
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- **iMessage DM/group:** `match.channel="imessage"` + `match.peer.id="<handle|chat_id:*|chat_guid:*|chat_identifier:*>"`. Prefer `chat_id:*` for stable group bindings.
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</ParamField>
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</ParamField>
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<ParamField path="bindings[].agentId" type="string">
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The owning OpenClaw agent id.
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</ParamField>
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@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ OpenClaw sandbox.
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- OpenClaw's sandbox policy does **not** wrap ACP harness execution.
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- OpenClaw still enforces ACP feature gates, allowed agents, session ownership, channel bindings, and Gateway delivery policy.
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- Use `runtime: "subagent"` for sandbox-enforced OpenClaw-native work.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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Current limitations:
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@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ Example schema:
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- `deny` — block.
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- `allowlist` — allow only if allowlist matches.
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- `full` — allow.
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</ParamField>
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</ParamField>
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### `tools.exec.strictInlineEval`
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@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ YOLO is the default host behavior unless you tighten it explicitly:
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- YOLO chooses **how** host exec is approved: `security=full` plus `ask=off`.
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- In YOLO mode, OpenClaw does **not** add a separate heuristic command-obfuscation approval gate or script-preflight rejection layer on top of the configured host exec policy.
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- `auto` does not make gateway routing a free override from a sandboxed session. A per-call `host=node` request is allowed from `auto`; `host=gateway` is only allowed from `auto` when no sandbox runtime is active. For a stable non-auto default, set `tools.exec.host` or use `/exec host=...` explicitly.
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</Warning>
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</Warning>
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CLI-backed providers that expose their own noninteractive permission mode
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can follow this policy. Claude CLI adds
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@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ EOF
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- `openclaw exec-policy` does not synchronize node approvals.
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- `openclaw exec-policy set --host node` is rejected.
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- Node exec approvals are fetched from the node at runtime, so node-targeted updates must use `openclaw approvals --node ...`.
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</Note>
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</Note>
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### Session-only shortcut
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